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Abstract 
 
The paper analyzes the interplay of product market competition and governance on CEO 
compensation in Italian listed firms from 2000 to 2011 and tests the impact of the 2007-08 
financial crisis on pay-performance sensitivity. We argue that important differences both in the 
level of compensation and in its sensitivity to firm performance depend on two conditioning 
factors: family ownership and source of the competitive pressure. A novel aspect of our paper is 
that we rely on two definitions of competition: the intensity of import penetration, which 
accounts for price competition, and the intensity of R&D and advertising expenditures, which 
captures the oligopolistic nature of competition when products are vertically differentiated. 
Overall, the compensation of Italian CEOs is positively related to firm performance. Moreover, 
consistent with our predictions, sensitivity is higher in competitive sectors and the difference 
between family and non-family CEOs disappear when competition is tough. Family CEOs are 
significantly less paid than non-family CEOs and their pay is significantly related to firm 
performance. However, behind this sensitivity we find asymmetric responses to performance 
changes: while non-family CEOs pay mainly responds to negative changes, family CEOs pay is 
sensitive only to positive changes. Finally, we find that the 2007 financial crisis reduces the 
difference between family and non-family CEO by decreasing the level of compensation of non-
family CEOs and increasing its responsiveness to performance. Altogether, our results provide 
supporting evidence to the idea that market competition eventually prevails over family ties 
even in a family-controlled governance system such as in Italy. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Despite the large number of empirical and theoretical studies devoted to executive compensation 
the issue of whether current compensation policies are the result of optimal contracting or of rent 
extraction by powerful managers that set their own pay is still highly debated. On one hand, the 
trend in top executive compensation in the last few decades has been explained as the result of en-
trenched managers designing their own compensation contracts with the support of captive boards. 
On the other hand, it has been stressed that high compensation contracts result from intense compe-
tition for scarce managerial talent and particularly for the most-talented ones. For example, Murphy 
and Zabojnik (2004) explain the rise in executive pay in the last decades with the increase in the 
importance of general skills as opposed to firm-specific knowledge. This, according to the authors, 
has spurred competition in the market for executives and has determined the high level of pay ob-
served.  
An important factor underlying both explanations of managerial compensation is the func-
tioning of the corporate governance system. The rent extraction theory implies that factors that may 
restrain the amount of rents executives can extract, such as monitoring by the board of directors or 
by block-holders, are not functioning properly. According to the optimal contracting theory, instead, 
managerial compensation is just one element of the many firms choose when deciding their corpo-
rate governance systems. Then, to understand how incentives work we need to take into considera-
tion all factors and their interplay. Furthermore, there may be governance externalities among firms 
affecting the choice of the contract offered (Acharya and Volpin 2010, Acharya, Gabarro and Vol-
pin 2012).   
Beside internal control mechanism, a powerful force mitigating the agency problems caused 
by separation between managers and shareholders is product market competition. If competition is 
at work, failure to pursue value maximization will eventually lead the firm to exit the market. De-
spite the ambiguous theoretical predictions on the effect of product market competition on incentive 
compensation, the growing empirical literature clearly indicates that increased competition results 
in a more widespread and intense use of incentive pay. The evidence suggests that product competi-
tion affects both the level and the composition of executive compensation and, by reducing the 
fixed component, it restraints the extraction of rents by the top executives at the expenses of share-
holders. Thus, product competition is quite effective in providing the proper incentives to top man-
agers. 
3 
 
Internal and external incentive mechanisms are interrelated, and the firm’s reaction to 
changes in product market competition may be influenced by corporate governance as shown by 
few recent papers.  Amore and Zaldokas (2012), for example,  show that worse corporate govern-
ance makes U.S. firms either unable or unwilling to accommodate changes in competitive pressure 
after the Free Trade Agreement with Canada. This seems to suggest that firms with different corpo-
rate governance may react differently to changes in product market competition (see also Giroud 
and Mueller (2010)). The same qualitative result emerges by a study on the effect of changes in 
competition on private benefits as measured by voting premium (Guadalupe and Perez-Gonzales 
2011). 
The influence of firm level corporate governance on executive compensation is affected also 
by the legal and corporate systems in which firms operate. For instance, in countries with concen-
trated ownership, family firms are common.  The most important distinguishing features of family 
firms are the presence of family members in the top management and the large number of CEOs 
with family ties.  Then, the question becomes how the compensation of a family CEO is deter-
mined, and what is the impact of family ties on the magnitude and composition of compensation. 
On one hand, family CEOs have long-term objectives and high rewards in case of good perfor-
mance, so that there is less need to use compensation to provide incentives. On the other hand, CEO 
may be selected because of his/her family ties rather than ability and CEO compensation can be just 
a mean used by the controlling family to perform the rent extraction activity at the expense of mi-
nority shareholders. However, competitive pressure in the product market may limit rent extraction 
by controlling families and restrict the possibility to appoint a family CEO just for the family status; 
incompetent CEOs selected because of their family relationship, are unlikely to successfully man-
age the firm in a highly competitive environment.  
In the present paper, we explore the interplay of governance and product competition by an-
alyzing how product market competition affects CEO compensation in a corporate system charac-
terized by concentrated ownership and family control. To this end we look at the effects of competi-
tive pressure and family control on CEO compensation in a sample of Italian listed firms over the 
period 2000-2011. In addition, the period considered allows us to analyze the effect of the 2007-
2008 financial crisis and to investigate whether and how it has affected CEO compensation in the 
subsequent years. We believe that the Italian case is an interesting environment to analyze the inter-
play of competitive pressure and ownership and control on the design of CEO compensation for 
several reasons. First, previous studies have found large private benefits of control in Italy and have 
suggested that there may be a severe agency problem between controlling shareholder and minority 
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shareholders. Second, Italian corporate governance has recently undergone some significant chang-
es in the direction of higher transparency (shorter pyramidal structure, lower ownership concentra-
tion, larger share of institutional investors, more independent boards). Despite these changes, the 
main characteristics of ownership structure are still concentrated ownership, family control3, and 
limited institutional investors’ activism. In 2013, the 48.99% of Italian listed companies (corre-
sponding to 24.8% of market capitalization) was controlled by a single shareholder with a majority 
of the shares. These percentages increase to 55.1 and 33.6, respectively, if we consider only manu-
facturing firms.4 Finally, Italian firms operate mainly in traditional sectors where the competition 
from countries with low labor cost is intensive. Empirical evidence suggests that Italian firms have 
reacted to the increased competition by reducing prices and mark-ups. Thus, an interesting question 
to investigate is if and how this increase in competitive pressure has affected CEOs compensation 
and particularly the compensation of CEOs in family firms.  
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge it is the first 
study of the interplay between competition and family firms. Recently, some studies have examined 
the relationship between competition and other aspects of corporate governance, such as the anti-
takeover regulation (Giraud and Mueller 2010 and Amore and Zaldokas 2011) or  the voting premi-
um between shares with different voting rights (Guadalupe and Perez-Gonzales 2011) suggesting 
that the hypothesis that competition reduces managerial slack can have several implications. We 
pursue this issue in a different direction, looking at differences in the effect of competition on the 
compensation of family and non-family CEOs. Second, we measure competition along two different 
directions: by the intensity of import penetration, which account for price competition, and by the 
intensity of the sunk investment in intangible assets such as R&D and advertising expenditures, that 
captures the oligopolistic nature of competition among differentiated products where dominates 
non-price competition.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the related literature framework 
from which we draw our testable hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy while Sec-
tion 4 describes the dataset, the variables and the summary statistics. Section 5 presents the results 
of the econometric analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                            
3 The family was the ultimate controlling agent in 152 listed companies out of 251 at the end of 2012 and in June 2013 
the number of companies where a single shareholder owns more than half of ordinary shares is 121 out of 247 (Consob 
2013 Report on corporate governance of Italian listed companies). 
4 Consob, 2013 Report on Corporate Governance of Italian listed companies. 
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2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses  
This paper is related to two strands of literature, the literature on the effects of (product) market 
competition on executive compensation and the literature on the relationship between firm corpo-
rate governance and executive compensation.  
2.1 Market competition 
The theoretical predictions on the effects of product market competition on managerial incentives 
are ambiguous. According to the type of competition and how competition is measured, a rise in the 
competitive pressure can lead both to an increase or decrease of the optimal level of managerial in-
centive and, as a result of this, of the incentive-related pay (Vives 2004). Indeed, changes in compet-
itive pressure may take place in several ways and the effects are different according to the source of 
the increase in competition: a rise in the number of firms, a change in the degree of product differ-
entiation or a change in the entry cost.   
When competitive pressure arises by a higher degree of product substitutability, the optimal 
level of effort is lower and this in turn decreases the optimal incentive provided to the manager (see 
Graziano and Parigi 1998 and Raith 2003).  When instead the number of firms rises, the result is 
ambiguous. The reason for this ambiguity rests on the fact that there are two opposing forces at 
work when more firms compete in the same market. The first effect is that firm market share tends 
to decrease with more intense competition due to free entry reducing the incentive to exert effort. 
The second and opposite effect arises because the elasticity of market share to productivity increas-
es and thus the return to higher effort grows. Hence, it pays to incentivize the manager to reduce 
costs and improve performance. Which effect prevails is not clear a priori. However, Schmidt 
(Schmidt 1997) demonstrated that when increased competition leads to higher threat of bankruptcy 
and exit from the market, the effect is unambiguous and optimal effort rises independently of the 
type of competition.  Thus, we expect higher incentives whenever firm survival is at risk.  
In the last two decades, Italian firms have been subject to stronger foreign competition. New emerg-
ing countries entered the WTO, trade barriers have been reduced and imports from emerging coun-
tries with low labor cost have increased dramatically. This is particularly important since most Ital-
ian firms operate in traditional sectors where entry barriers are small.  For example, Bugamelli, Fa-
biani and Sette (2008) show that Italian firms have been affected by import penetration by Chinese 
products and, as a result of this, have reduced prices and markups and this effect is stronger in less 
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technologically advanced sectors and, within these sectors, for less productive firms. This suggests 
that Italian firms operating in less technologically advanced sectors are exposed to penetration of 
products from countries with low labor cost and that higher import penetration may represent a 
threat for the survival of Italian firms. On this basis, we expect to find a positive relationship be-
tween the intensity of foreign competition and pay-performance sensitivity in Italian firms. This 
leads us to formulate the following hypothesis on the effect of imports on managerial pay-
performance sensitivity.   
 
HP. 1: Firms in a more competitive environment, as measured by the degree of import penetration, 
provide stronger monetary incentive to their CEOs: CEO pay-performance sensitivity is larger in 
industries more exposed to foreign competition.  
 
The fast growing, though still limited, empirical literature on product-market competition and CEOs 
compensation provides support for the prediction that competition affects managerial pay and in-
creases pay-performance sensitivity. Hubbard and Palia (1995) and Cunat and Guadalupe (2009a) 
study the effect of deregulation of the U.S. banking sector on CEO compensation.  Hubbard and Pa-
lia do not find a clear effect on incentive-pay, however they show that CEO turnover is higher in 
unregulated banks.5  Cunat and Guadalupe (2009a) instead analyze the effect of competition on es-
timated pay-performance sensitivities and on the sensitivity of stock option grants, and show that 
increased competition following the two deregulation waves resulted in higher performance pay 
sensitivity of executive compensation schemes.   
The effect of an increased competitive pressure by foreign products is the focus also of Cu-
nat and Guadalupe (2005) and (2009b). Overall, they find that higher competitive pressure reduces 
the level of non-performance related pay, increases pay-performance sensitivity and increases wage 
differentials within firms since compensation increases for top executives. A different approach is 
followed by Abowd and Lemieux (1993) who look at the effect of firm profitability on negotiated 
wages using foreign competition shocks as a source of exogenous variation in firm's product market 
                                                            
5 A similar finding is obtained by DeFond and Park (1999), who look at the role of relative performance evaluation 
(RPE) in CEO turnover in US firms. Their hypothesis is that RPE is more useful among firms operating in more com-
petitive sectors as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Consistently with this hypothesis, they find that 
CEO turnover is negatively associated with the HHI. 
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conditions and find that increased competition (i.e. lower import and export prices) reduces both 
wages and quasi-rent per worker6.  
Summarizing, empirical studies find clear-cut evidence that an increase in foreign competi-
tion directly affect the incentives provided to top executives and that firms operating in more com-
petitive environments are the most affected.  
The above literature does not distinguish between price and non-price competition and focus mainly 
on the first type of strategic interactions. However, competition may induce different behavior when 
products are differentiated and firms have market power. As mentioned before, theoretical models 
suggest that product substitutability determines the manager’s optimal level of effort. Indeed, firms 
operating in oligopolistic markets have a strong incentive to differentiate their products in order to 
relax price competition and decrease demand elasticity. Along these lines, Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999) develop oligopoly models where an optimal managerial compensation scheme is related to 
the degree of product differentiation and show that, as product differentiation increases, managerial 
compensation becomes more sensitive to own firm performance and less to rivals performance. The 
degree of product differentiation is thus a key element in shaping the strategic interactions among 
firms that may also affect optimal compensation contract.  
Another twist in the definition of competitive pressure, which underlines the oligopolistic 
nature of competition and the importance of product differentiation, highlights the strategic use of 
intangible assets in enhancing and sustaining the competitive advantage of vertically differentiated 
products (Krugman 1979, Gabszewicz and Thisse 1980, Sutton, 1991, 1998, Davies, Lyons et al, 
1996). According to this view, the nature and the intensity of competition depend on the firm’s in-
vestment in sunk intangible assets - such as R&D and advertising and marketing expenditures - that 
increase product differentiation, consumer perceived quality of the product and willingness to pay. 
The distinguishing feature of these industries is that increases in market size are not associated with 
a rise in the number of firms but rather with rise in firm intangible sunk expenditures. This “escala-
tion” in R&D and advertising expenditures enables us to distinguish between vertically differentiat-
ed products, where competition relies on these (non-price) elements, and homogenous and horizon-
tally differentiated products where price competition dominates. Furthermore, it highlights the dif-
                                                            
6 Fernandes et al. (2014) use the change in firm entry regulation in Portugal after 2005 as quasi-natural experiment 
and study the effect of the increased product competition resulting from the reform on top-managers compensation. 
Their finding indicates that the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation decreased after the deregulation. The 
authors interpret this finding as consistent with Raith’s theoretical model where the effect of competition are different 
according to whether the increase in competition takes place through changes in market size or through a reduction of 
entry cost. 
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ferences in firm competitive strategies and in the required skills for CEOs willing to become a lead-
er in markets where non-price competition dominates. Therefore, by emphasizing the oligopolistic 
nature of competition and the strategic use of intangible assets to sustain the competitive advantage 
in these industries, this classification links the nature of competition  to the managerial talent hy-
pothesis whereby “a higher level of potential competition” requires “a more capable CEO and, 
therefore, higher and more responsive pay” (Hubbard and Palia, 1995, p. 108).  
The conceptual separation of industries according to the nature of competition somewhat 
overlaps with the foreign trade definition, as many oligopolistic vertically differentiated market are 
also highly internationalized and dominated by multinational enterprises, still it relies on an alterna-
tive perspective that we decide to explore in this paper.  
Furthermore sectors with high level of R&D and advertising expenditures have another fea-
ture relevant for compensation policy. The presence of intangible assets exacerbates the asymmetry 
of information between managers and shareholders making more difficult to evaluate manager ef-
fort. This in turn implies that, according to principal-agent theory managerial incentives should be 
stronger to align her objectives with those of the shareholders (see for example Milkovich, Gerhart 
and Hannon 1991).  
A countervailing force that may weaken managerial incentives is discussed by Aggarwal 
and Samwick (1999). When firms operate in oligopolistic markets, strategic considerations may in-
duce owners to manipulate incentives to attenuate competition because inducing highly aggressive 
managerial behavior may not be in their interest.  The authors show that when products are strategic 
complements as in the differentiated Bertrand model, shareholders benefit from less aggressive 
pricing strategy and managers are given weaker incentives to maximize own firms value and 
stronger incentive to maximize the value of all firms in the industry as competition increases.  
Summing up the fact that talent is more valuable in R&D intensive sectors and the effect of 
asymmetry of information, we expect sectors with high level of expenditures on intangible assets to 
have both high compensation and high pay-performance sensitivity. This leads to the following hy-
pothesis.  
 
HP. 2: CEO pay and pay-performance sensitivity are higher in industries with large investment ex-
penditures in intangible assets that increase the perceived product differentiation like advertising 
and R&D. 
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We are not aware of empirical studies analyzing the effect of non-price competition and 
product differentiation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to capture 
the diversity of competitive behavior among firms operating in the same market focusing on differ-
ent dimensions of competition and market power.  
 
2.2 Corporate governance and family firms  
Many firms around the world are not public companies, not even in countries with dispersed 
ownership as shown by Holderness (2009). In corporate governance systems with concentrated 
ownership and family membership, firms are often managed by a family member and this in turn 
implies a quite different incentive structure with respect to firms owned by atomistic shareholders. 
Family members can alleviate some agency problems and at the same time, they can exacerbate 
others. Then, the magnitude and the composition of executive compensation packages are deeply 
affected by family ties.  However, despite the importance of founding families and continued family 
ownership less attention has been paid to managerial compensation in environments with concen-
trated ownership. 
There are two competing views of why family firms are so prevalent, efficient response to 
the institutional environment or outcome of cultural norms that might be costly for corporate deci-
sion (see Bertrand and Schoar 2006 for a survey). The first view underlines the positive role that 
family can have and states that, family control can lead to superior economic results with respect to 
non-family firms. This is due to the long-term horizon of families as opposed to the short-termism 
and myopia of corporate managers, and possibly to the “within family correlation in managerial tal-
ent” (Bertrand and Schoar 2006 page 76). The negative view instead sees family firms as a subop-
timal economic organization emerging when cultural values induce the founder/owner to pursue 
nonmonetary objectives (see Banfield 1958 and Fukuyama 1995).  The theoretical analysis of the 
effect of family ties on CEO compensation reflects the two alternative points of view on the role of 
family firms summarized above. On the positive side, if the CEO is a member of the controlling 
family, his/her objective is already aligned and there is no need to rely on monetary incentives. Fur-
thermore, since family CEOs face less risk of being fired, there is less risk to be compensated and 
monetary compensation should be lower for family CEOs7. Another element that may reduce the 
                                                            
7 Evidence showing that the need to compensate family CEOs for the risk of being fired is lower in Italian 
listed firms is provided by Volpin (2002) and Brunello et al. (2003) who study the turnover-performance relationship. In 
particular, Brunello et al. find that CEO turnover is negatively related to firm performance, but this relationship holds 
only if the CEO is not the controlling shareholder. When the CEO belongs to the controlling family, no significant rela-
tionship emerges. 
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level of compensation for family CEOs is the lower value of their outside options given that family 
CEOs are unlikely to compete in the external managerial market (see for example Gomez-Mejia et 
al. 2003).  Hence, according to the positive view, family ties impact both the level and the composi-
tion of CEO compensation by lowering the fixed and the variable component. This leads us to the 
following hypothesis for the compensation of family CEOs. 
 
HP. 3a: (family CEOs) If family firms are an efficient response to the institutional environment, we 
expect lower compensation and lower pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs who are members of 
the controlling families than for non-family CEOs.  
 
The alternative hypothesis considers the negative impact that a controlling shareholder can 
have in absence of strong protection of minority shareholders and looks at CEO compensation as a 
possible mean used by the controlling family to extract rents at the expenses of other shareholders. 
Since expropriation takes place mainly through fixed compensation, this hypothesis predicts higher 
total pay while there is no clear prediction for variable pay that can be either lower or higher.  In-
deed, expropriation can take place also through variable pay as explained by Bebchuck who takes 
the view that managerial power and discretion play an important role in shaping executive compen-
sation. Although his analysis focuses on companies with widespread ownership where the main 
agency problem is between managers and shareholders, some of the problems pointed out apply al-
so to companies with a controlling family trying to expropriate minority shareholders. In particular, 
Bebchuck and Fried (2004) underline the role of “camouflage” in the design of compensation ar-
rangements with the aim to legitimate “the amount and performance-insensitivity of executive com-
pensation”. Camouflage for example can explain why bonuses and cash compensation are not de-
signed to reward the manager for his/her contribution to firm performance and why executive com-
pensation increases when firm profits rise for reasons that are independent of manager’s effort as 
shown by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). Similarly, when relative performance is used, the rel-
evant peer group may be selected strategically, choosing the one more favorable to the manager. A 
different form of camouflage can be represented by an asymmetric relationship between pay and 
performance so that pay increases when performance rises but it does not decreases when perfor-
mance worsens. All this leads us to formulate the following hypothesis alternative to HP. 3a.  
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HP. 3b: (family CEOs) Under the expropriation view, we expect higher level of compensation for 
family CEOs and weak pay-performance sensitivity. Moreover, if incentive pay is higher for family 
CEOs than for non-family CEOs this should be due to a suboptimal pay structure consistent with 
“camouflage activities” like compensation for luck, or asymmetric relation between pay and per-
formance. 
 
Overall, there is empirical evidence supporting both the positive and the negative view of 
the role of family ties on CEO compensation, though the majority is consistent with the first one 
predicting lower pay and lower pay-performance sensitivity. In a sample of publicly traded US fam-
ily-controlled firms, Gomez-Mejia et al. ( 2003) show that CEOs who are members of the control-
ling family are paid less (lower total pay) than outside CEO and their pay is less sensitive to firm 
performance.  The difference gets larger as family ownership as well as R&D investment increase. 
As discussed above, R&D investment has a positive effect on CEO pay, primarily in the form of 
long-term income. This is confirmed in their sample but only for non-family-CEOs. Evidence in fa-
vor of the first hypothesis is found also in a sample of European firms by Croci, Gonenc and 
Gozkan (2012).  
On the other hand, the rent extraction hypothesis is supported by the finding of Cohen and 
Lauterbach (2008) who analyze the compensation of family versus non-family CEOs in a sample of 
Israeli firms. Family CEOs are paid more and their pay-performance sensitivity is lower (though in-
significantly).  
Controlling shareholders and blockholders have a clear monitoring advantage on small and dis-
persed shareholders since they are not affected by the free-riding problem faced by dispersed own-
ers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Hence, the CEO of a firm where the main shareholder owns a sig-
nificant share, is strictly monitored. Indeed, the main agency problem in firms with concentrated 
ownership is between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, rather than between 
managers and shareholders. Contrary to what happens in public companies with dispersed owner-
ship, large shareholders may have an incentive to over-monitor (see Pagano and Roell, 1998) and in 
family firms there may even be an ”excessive” involvement of owners in the management of the 
firm with the resulting negative effect on the managerial initiative (see Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi 
1998). Thus, we can expect CEOs in firms with a controlling shareholder being strictly monitored. 
In this case there is less need to rely on monetary compensation to incentivize managers. This leads 
us to formulate the following hypothesis:  
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HP. 4: (Non-family CEOs) We expect the compensation of non-family CEOs to have a weak 
pay-performance sensitivity due to the concentrated ownership structure and the resulting monitor-
ing incentive for large shareholders and blockholders.  
 
Evidence in favor of this hypothesis is offered by Brunello et al. (2001), who estimate the 
pay-performance elasticity of top manager remunerations in a non-representative sample of Italian 
firms. Their analysis provides strong evidence on the importance of ownership structure: pay–
performance sensitivity is higher in firms that are less likely to be affected by the main features of 
Italian capitalism.  The authors interpret this finding as supportive of the view that the specific Ital-
ian economic environment leads to a lower sensitivity of managerial pay to firm performance. The 
low sensitivity of Italian executive pay to firm performance is confirmed by a recent study by Co-
nyon, Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos and Murphy (2010) on ten European countries, among which Ita-
ly8. 
The recent financial crisis of 2007-08 provides us with a unique opportunity to verify the 
role of family involvement in firm management. During the financial crisis firms revenues and 
stock market value decreased significantly and the high compensations and high bonuses paid by 
firms with very negative results has determined a public outcry. The public and the media strongly 
criticized the very generous pay packages received by the top executives even in firms suffering se-
vere losses and firing employees. This in turn has produced recommendations and reforms mandat-
ing higher transparency and better disclosure of the firm compensation policy. Though the sample 
period considered in the present study is not affected by the proposed reforms in Italy9 we expect 
nonetheless to find a clear impact on the level and/or structure of pay.   
 
HP. 5: (financial crisis) We expect the 2007-08 financial crisis to increase the pay-performance 
sensitivity both for family and nonfamily CEOs.  
 
2.3 Market competition or family ties? 
The hypotheses discussed above have been derived by looking separately at product compe-
tition and family control. However, firms operate in environments with different degree of competi-
                                                            
8 According to their study the composition of Italian CEO pay in 2008 is as follows: 56% base salary;  16% bonuses;  
6% option grant; 3% Stock Pay and 19% Other pay. The only estimated pay-performance elasticity marginally signifi-
cant is the one where performance is measured by sales growth and is negative (-.310). 
9 Starting in 2012 listed firms are required to make public the firm remuneration policy for top executives. 
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tion and, at the same time, have different governance. Then, the issue is how these two aspects in-
teract and whether they are complements or substitutes.  
When competition is tough, selecting the CEO from a small pool of family members can 
lead to significant underperformance endangering firm survival. As a result, we expect family firms 
operating in highly competitive markets to separate family and business objectives and to rely less 
on family members to select the CEO. In a highly competitive environment, also family firms are 
likely to compete for hiring the best possible CEO from the pool of managerial talent10. Hence, we 
expect the selected CEO to have the necessary skills irrespective of his/her family status. This im-
plies that if a family member is appointed as CEO he/she has the same outside option as non-family 
CEOs and this in turn results in the need for the firm to offer a competitive compensation package. 
In other words, we expect that the effect of competition will mitigate, and perhaps cancel, the influ-
ence of family firm and family ties on managerial compensation. 
 
HP. 6: In highly competitive industries, pay-performance sensitivity of family and non-family CEOs 
should be the same and should also be equal to the compensation of CEOs in non-family firms.  
 
 
3 Empirical Strategy  
The corporate finance literature typically quantifies managerial incentives by estimating 
pay-performance sensitivity, i.e. by relating changes in CEO compensation to a measure of firm 
performance (Murphy, 1985, Jensen and Murphy, 1990, Goergen and Renneboog, 2011, Murphy 
2012). The econometric specifications differ depending on whether one wants to obtain the magni-
tude of the sensitivity (e.g. the dollar change in CEO’s wealth associated with a dollar change in 
shareholders’ wealth, as in the seminal Jensen and Murphy’s paper), or the elasticity (the percentage 
change in CEO pay associated with the percentage change in, say, shareholders’ wealth), or the 
semi-elasticity (the percentage change in CEO pay associated with a 1 unit change in a profitability 
index). The elasticity specification requires a logarithmic transformation for both pay and perfor-
mance while the semi-elasticity implies that the only the dependent variable is logged. We estimate 
the elasticity of managerial compensation to market capitalization (MarketCap) and the semi-
elasticity to an accounting profitability ratio (the return on asset, ROA).  
                                                            
10 We already saw in section 2.1 that the managerial talent hypothesis is related to the degree of competition in the in-
dustry.  
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Given the longitudinal nature of our data (117 firms tracked from 2000 to 2011), pooling 
time and cross-section observations and using OLS would result in biased and inconsistent esti-
mates due to the presence of omitted firm-specific effects. We thus estimate panel regressions using 
the fixed-effect model, which allows us to account for unobservable firm characteristics that do not 
change over time.  Indeed, using firm fixed-effects as a stratification variable does not account for 
the fact that different CEOs may have managed the company in the period. Therefore, we include 
CEO tenure, the number of year the CEO served in the company to account for managerial turno-
ver, which may bring undesirable breaks in the estimation. In addition, CEO tenure allows us both 
to test whether managers’ compensations tend to rise with tenure as well as with firm size and to 
control for potential managerial entrenchment, since a longer tenure is typically associated with 
CEO’s internal power by the corporate governance literature (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Hu and 
Kumar, 2004). As a further CEO specific characteristic, we control for CEO age, which is often 
used to proxy for CEO experience and expertise, by including a dichotomous variable to denote 
whether the CEO has at least 61 years of age (the 75th percentile in our sample). Finally, we include 
firm size because past research has established that remunerations tend to increase with firm size. 
From the empirical point of view, the main purpose of this paper is to estimate the effect of 
competition on CEO pay, i.e. if a more competitive environment increases the required managerial 
skills and, accordingly, the willingness of shareholders to propose incentive contracts that link their 
compensation to firm performance. In our case, this boils down to asking whether CEO pay-
performance sensitivity is higher in firms subject to a tougher competitive environment and whether 
differences in the competitive mechanism – “price” competition due to increasing exposition to for-
eign trade or “non-price” competition in endogenous sunk cost markets – may imply differences in 
the remuneration schemes.  
The identification of the effect of competition on pay-performance sensitivity raises several 
econometric concerns. First, ideally, one would like to rely on a natural experiment to control for an 
external change in the competitive conditions for the firms, such as a sudden appreciation of the 
currency (Cunat and Guadalupe, 2005) or a sudden reduction in trade barriers (Cunat and Guada-
lupe, 2009). Such a sudden change is not available in Italy over the sample period for the Italian 
economy.11 Therefore, in the absence of a well defined natural experiment during the sample period 
                                                            
11 With respect to a foreign trade shock, although it is true that the Italian economy, similarly to other EU member 
states, has been subject to a gradual trade liberalization process, with increasing import penetration by Chinese prod-
ucts, this process started at the beginning of the 2000’s (as did the Lira/Euro changeover), and gradually, but not uni-
formly spread to industrial sectors. Moreover, especially in the first decade, Chinese products typically competed with 
low-quality undifferentiated goods in traditional sectors while our sample comprises large quoted firms operating in a 
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2000-2011, we use dichotomous variables based on the import penetration in the year 2000 (the first 
year in the data) to differentiate the competitive environment. For the purpose of a “quasi-natural” 
experiment, however, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 is probably better equipped and, even if the 
theoretical implications for competition as well as for incentive contracts are still uncertain, we will 
use this episode to investigate the impact of the crises on the pay-performance sensitivity within the 
non-financial sector in Italy. The empirical approach we follow for this analysis will be more in line 
with a difference-in-difference strategy.     
Second, as explained in Section 2, foreign trade covers, by definition, one only kind of com-
petitive pressure. One novelty of this study is to analyze the impact of competition on incentive 
compensations not only through the lens of foreign trade, but also hinging on a different way to 
“measure” the nature of competition, more typical of the new industrial organization literature,. For 
this concept of “competition”, based on the endogenous sunk costs incurred by the firm to sustain 
the competitive advantage in oligopolistic markets, is likewise difficult to find an exogenous shock. 
So, in the end, in the empirical analysis, firms are therefore classified as more or less subject to 
competitive pressure (under both definitions) based on their primary industry. Because the primary 
industry is typically invariant over time, hence perfectly collinear to the firm fixed effects (which of 
course cannot be omitted); we investigate differences in sensitivity by interacting firm performance 
with the primary industry type (high and low import penetration; high and low R&D and advertis-
ing expenditures, at the industry level) . The third econometric issue is that managers are not ran-
domly assigned to firms operating in more or less competitive industries. In want of a natural exper-
iment, as pointed out above, we choose to rely on family ownership, an important feature of the Ital-
ian corporate governance, to help us with identification of the effect of competition. As described in 
Section 2, the economic literature has recognized many differences, including predictions about 
monitoring strategies and remuneration schemes, between family- and non-family firms and, to a 
deeper level, between firms run by a member of the controlling family and those run by a profes-
sional manager.12  We exploit a key variable in our hand-collected dataset, i.e. the information 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
wide range of vertically, horizontally and homogeneous sectors. All of this suggests that using the China foreign trade 
episode would be incomplete and at best imprecise and blurred from both the cross-sectional a temporal point of views.   
12 We began with the family ownership perspective and then we moved on to collect information about family CEOs 
partly inspired by the literature and partly for a practical reason. While both family ownership and family management 
may, in principle, be expected to vary over time, we noticed that this is not the case in our sample of Italian firms, 
where the large majority of family owned firms do not change their status over the sample period, thus depriving us of 
the necessary firm-level variation. Fortunately, when we look at management we do not find the same immovability and 
resilience to change. Not all family firms are managed by family CEOs and in most firms there is a turnover between 
family and non-family managers in the sample period. Therefore, when we investigate whether similar incentive con-
tracts work similarly across family and non-familyCEO, we can use specifications that interact firm performance with 
the Fam_CEO dummy.  
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about firm ownership (controlling shareholding) and about the parental relationships of the CEO 
with the controlling family. We use this information as well as the received wisdom described in 
Section 2, to test if differences in pay-performance sensitivity that can be related to family control 
(family and non-family CEOs) tend to disappear whenever the company is subject to tougher com-
petition.  In other words, our identification strategy relies on the idea that, under tougher competi-
tive conditions, all family-related idiosyncratic features in the compensation contract should be lev-
eled out when competitive pressure bites.  
Consistently with this approach, we ground the descriptive analysis of the data on tests of 
the mean differences in the distribution of family firms and family CEOs across different types of 
competition.  We then examine mean differences in CEO compensations and in firm profitability. 
Next, we turn to regression analysis. To summarize, the baseline specification is the following: 
itti
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

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where Log(CEOcomp)it is the logarithmic transformation of total compensation (inflation 
corrected) awarded by the CEO in the year and Firm_Performance it is the performance variable 
and can enter either in logarithmic form when we use the firm’s market capitalization (MarketCap 
it) or in linear form when we use an accounting profitability ratio (ROA it).  Tenureit indicates the 
number of years served as a CEO in the company and Log(FirmSize) it is the log of real sales, 
CEO_Age is a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 when the CEO age is at least 61 (the 75th per-
centile in our dataset).  μi is the firm specific fixed effect, t are the year dummies and εit is the error 
term. To detect differences in CEO pay-performance sensitivity we interact performance measures 
with two dichotomous and time invariant variables indicating low and high competitive pressure as 
defined by import penetration (IMP_PEN) or by R&D and advertising intensity (TYPEjt).  To test 
the impact of competition across family control, we further interact the performance measure with 
two dichotomous variables that identifies whether the CEO is related or not with the controlling 
family (FAMCEOit).   
 
4 Data source and variables used in the analysis  
 
4.1 Data description  
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Our study uses an unbalanced panel of 117 Italian non-financial firms listed on the Italian exchange 
and tracked over the period 2000-2011 (1173 firm-year observations). Our sample includes the en-
tire Italian market at this time, excluding only those firms which were not appropriate for our study, 
such as companies that had less than four continuous years of CEO compensation data, and firms 
that were objects of merger or large divestiture operations.13 The time frame is imposed by the fact 
that managerial compensation data only became publicly available in Italy in 2000, when CON-
SOB, (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa), the national authority ruling on equity 
markets (the Italian counterpart of the US Securities Exchange Commission) released a new rule 
whereby listed companies are required to disclose information on managers’ compensations in their 
annual reports14.  
 The research questions we try to answer in this paper require data from different sources. 
First and foremost, we need information about CEOs’ identity and remuneration schemes. Second, 
we need measures of firm performance, to be related to CEO pay in order to determine whether Ital-
ian firms rely on this corporate governance mechanism. Third, we need variables that capture the 
competitive environment in which Italian firms operate. To this end, as argued in Section 2, we rely 
on the intensity of foreign competitive pressure as measured by import penetration and on the inten-
sity of R&D and advertising expenditures as a proxy of the strategic use of product differentiation. 
Fourth, following the literature documenting the fact that a large majority of Italian listed firms, 
even the very large mature ones, are ultimately family-owned (Volpin 2002, Carpenter and Rondi, 
2006, and Rondi and Elston, 2009) and often managed by family CEOs, we collected information 
about firms’ ownership structure, board of directors’ composition and CEOs’ parental relation with 
controlling shareholders.     
 Managerial or executive compensation is the key variable in our study.  The data for this 
measure were collected from annual end-of-year reports using the classification system required by 
the CONSOB which include four items: Base Compensation, Bonuses (Monetary Benefits), Non-
Monetary Benefits, and Other Compensation.  We define Total Compensation the sum of the four 
items and use this in the regression estimations because a careful inspection of the data across firms 
and time revealed that the individual items are not uniformly reported by companies. Moreover, for 
a subsample of companies, the only available information is the total amount of CEO compensation. 
A comprehensive measure of CEO pay should also cover the values of the CEO’s stock and option 
                                                            
13 The final sample totaled 117 out of the original 227 listed firms in the “Industrial Companies" segment of Borsa Ital-
iana as of 2012.  
14 The CONSOB regulation n. 11971 was released on May 14, 1999.  
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holdings. However, the classification system of the CONSOB does not allow us to obtain a con-
sistent and reliable measure of the value of stock options and stock option plans, and when we tried 
to collect the detailed information which is needed to construct this variable we found that these da-
ta are not disclosed for the large majority of the sample firms. We complete information about the 
CEO’s by including two CEO-specific characteristics, CEO Tenure and the dummy CEO_Age. The 
former indicates the number of years the CEO served in the company and controls for CEO turno-
ver, which brings undesirable breaks in the time series when we estimate the pay-performance sen-
sitivity at the firm level.  CEO Tenure accounts for the fact that compensations usually increase 
with tenure over time and also, to some extent, for managerial entrenchment, as it is likely that 
managers become more entrenched the longer they stay in a company. The latter, CEO’s age, is a 
way to control for the manager’s experience and expertise.  
 The compensation data are integrated with annual financial and accounting and ownership 
firm-level data taken from the CERIS database (2001) and subsequent updates15, which we used to 
calculate the book and market-based measured of performance. We thus use two performance 
measures: Market Capitalization, i.e. the product between the share price at the end of the year and 
the number of outstanding shares in the market (sourced from Indici e Dati, by Mediobanca’s annu-
al reports); and Return on Assets (ROA), a measure of accounting profitability given by the ratio be-
tween ebitda (earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation) and total assets, which captures how 
efficiently managers use firm total assets, regardless of the financial structure.  
 To account for the competitive pressure deriving from foreign trade, we use Import Penetra-
tion, the ratio between industry import and apparent consumption, sourced from OECD STAN-
Database for Structural Analysis (ISIC–Rev. 4) and defined as Mjt/(Yjt+Mjt-Xjt) where M, Y, and X 
are industry j’s annual import, production and export respectively in the year 2000, in Italy. From 
this ratio we obtain a dichotomous variable, IMP_PEN2000, which categorizes industries into Low 
(below the median) and High Import Penetration (LIP and HIP) industries that can be used to ana-
lyze if pay-performance varies across firms subject to different levels of exposure to foreign trade.  
                                                            
15 The CERIS database contains extensive information on ca. 1800 Italian industrial firms over the period 1977-2011 
(Benfratello et al. 2001). It is constructed and updated using multiple sources. Balance sheet, dividends and stock ex-
change data are collected from two annual directories, Le Principali Società, Indici e Dati and Il Calepino 
dell’Azionista, all published by Mediobanca, a large Italian investment bank. Extensive information about the firms’ ul-
timate ownership, corporate governance, group affiliation, location, age, and business activity was obtained from annual 
reports, DUN’s Bradstreet, company websites, CONSOB, the Italian Exchange (Borsa Italiana) website and other direc-
tories.  
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We then draw on the industrial organization literature for the classification of competitive 
pressure based on the competitive advantage obtained via endogenous sunk costs in intangible as-
sets (Sutton, 1991, 1998), as typically in oligopolistic markets that rely on “non-price” competition. 
Accordingly, we classify industries producing homogeneous or horizontally differentiated products, 
based on low advertising and R&D expenditures, (Type 0) and vertically differentiated industries 
(Type 1). For operational purposes, we use the 3-digit NACE industrial classification used based on 
R&D and advertising to sales ratios for UK industries, constructed by Davies et al. 1996 to analyze 
the competitive mechanisms in the European Union industry, and revised by Matraves and Rondi, 
2007).  
 Finally, our theoretical framework accounts for the corporate governance environment 
where the sample firms operate, which is characterized by family firms. We consider the role family 
ownership at two levels, as controlling shareholders and as insiders, since members of the family 
are often in charge of executive roles. To this end, we constructed a dummy for “Family owner-
ship”, based on CONSOB reports that provide information about shareholders with > 2% holdings16 
as well as about the components of directors’ boards. The collected information confirmed anecdo-
tal evidence about ownership and control of Italian family firms. First, the “family” or the individu-
al investor often holds the controlling stake directly rather than indirectly through a holding compa-
ny.  This finding is reasonable because the founder or entrepreneur-manager who took the company 
public, or one of their heirs, usually sits on the board together with other members of his family. Al-
ternatively, these family owners are often members of pyramidal groups where ownership and con-
trol are seemingly separated, but members of the founding family keep executive roles.  We thus 
matched the ownership data with the owner’s position on the board of directors and/or on the mana-
gerial board, as well as with information about parental links across board members (as required by 
CONSOB regulation about stocks owned by board members), and we found that controlling fami-
lies often participate in top management in Italy, confirming findings of La Porta Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (1999) about the presence of “family CEOs” in countries where investor protection is 
weak (Enriques and Volpin, 2007).  We therefore constructed another dummy FAM_CEO to identi-
fy when the CEO is also a member of the controlling family. Specifically, the data show that “fami-
ly ownership” holds in 65% of firm-year observations and “family control”, i.e. a family CEO is in 
charge in 61.3% of the family-owned firms.  
 
                                                            
16 We use 50% as cut-off values in the definition of family control.   
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4.2 Descriptive evidence  
Table 1 presents descriptive evidence on the main characteristics of our sample. It shows 
that average CEO tenure is 7 years, and average age is 55. Family firms are clearly predominant:  
(70% of observations), while family CEOs represent the 43.7%. Finally, 56% of observations refer 
to firms operating in industries with high R&D and advertising (vertically differentiated products, 
or Type 1) and 48% to firms operating in industries with high import penetration.  
Table 2 explores the distribution of family firms and family CEOs across industries classi-
fied by intensity and type of competition. Since this is a key factor in the identification of the im-
pact of competition on incentive compensation, in this table we test whether the distributions of 
family and non-family firms and family- and non-family CEOs statistically differ across industries 
with different degrees and types of competition. Family firms tend to cluster significantly in verti-
cally differentiated (Type 1) vis-à-vis homogeneous and horizontally differentiated product (Type 
0), and in High Import Penetration (HIP) vis-à-vis Low Import Penetration (LIP). When we turn to 
the distribution of family CEOs, we find a significantly larger share of family CEOs in Type-1 in-
dustries and in High import penetration industries. In the bottom row, we test the distribution of 
family- and non-family CEOs employed within family firms and we find a significantly larger share 
of family CEOs in Type 1 firms, but a statistically similar distribution across low and high import 
penetration industries.  
Overall, the results suggest that family firms tend to concentrate in sectors subject to rela-
tively tougher competitive pressure. Moreover, family firms seem to prefer to be managed by fami-
ly-CEOs when non-price competition prevails while no preference emerges in high/low import pen-
etration. However, note that all values in the last raw are larger than 50% indicating that regardless 
of the sector, the majority of family firms is managed by a family member. This is good news for 
our identification strategy, since we plan to test whether the impact of competition leads family and 
non-family firms and CEOs to have similar compensation policies.  
As argued in Section 2, we expect that price competition prevails within HIP and Type-0 
sectors, and non-price competition prevails within Type-1 industries and we want to investigate 
how the different competitive environment affects CEOs compensation. We start in this section by 
looking at pay levels while in the following sections the regression analysis will analyze the struc-
ture of the compensation, i.e. the fixed and variables components. 
In Table 3, Panel A, we look at the impact of competition and governance on the levels of 
CEO compensation and we present summary statistics and mean differences on CEO total compen-
sation in the whole sample, by intensity of competition and by family-status (origin) of the CEO. 
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Panel B instead looks at mean differences in firm (accounting) performance as measured by ROA, 
return on assets, by intensity of competition and by family-status (origin) of the CEO. 
The t-tests on mean differences show that managerial compensations are quantitatively 
(though not significantly) higher in Type-1 industries as predicted by our Hypothesis 2. In contrast, 
CEO pay is significantly lower in sectors with high import penetration, thus suggesting that compe-
tition tends to reduce levels of compensation, but only when it is measured by import penetration.   
Turning to the family status of the CEO, we find that family CEOs are paid significantly less 
than non-family CEOs regardless of the type competition, a finding that is consistent with our Hy-
pothesis 3a about the level of compensations. Moreover, family CEOs in type 1 sectors obtain com-
pensations significantly higher than family CEOs in type 0 sector, consistently with our Hypothesis 
2.  
Overall, the evidence presented suggests that in Type 1 sectors  managerial effort and talent 
are high in demand to make competitive advantage more sustainable and firm less likely to be imi-
tated. However, this is at variance with the finding that the fraction of family CEOs is higher in 
Type-1 industries (see Table 2). If managerial talent is high in demand we would expect firms to 
search for the best manager in the whole pool of managers, hence a less skewed distribution of fam-
ily and non-family CEOs. A possible interpretation is that family firms might prefer to be in charge 
in sectors where the presence of intangible assets makes more difficult to evaluate the manager. 
In Panel B of Table 3, we test the differences in firm performance, using ROA as an ac-
counting measure of profitability. We find that, profitability is significantly (and quantitatively) 
higher where competitive pressure is tougher (according to our definition), both in terms of import 
penetration and as measured by strategic investment in intangible sunk costs. This suggests that, as 
found also by other studies, the lack of competitive pressure in these sectors is probably more con-
ducive to a “quiet life” than to higher profits (see for example Giroud and Mueller 2011 and Guada-
lupe and Perez-Gonzales 2011). When we turn to differences by CEO family status, we find that 
profitability is significantly higher when the firm is managed by a non-family CEO.  However, 
when we disaggregate by competitive pressure, family CEOs do significantly better than non-family 
CEOs in industries with high import penetration and report the same ROA within Type-1 industries.  
Interestingly, non-family CEOs perform significantly better only in industries with low import pen-
etration and homogeneous products (Type-0).   
The descriptive evidence presented so far suggests that there may be two different kinds of 
family CEOs, one that extract rents from relatively underperforming firms and another one that at-
tains high profitability and is more in line with a positive agency-solving view of large shareholder. 
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However, this pattern is contingent on the intensity of competition in the market, and it is time now 
that we focus on the structure, not only on the level, of the managers’ compensations.   
 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Pay-performance sensitivity and industry competition   
To set the scene, we begin with the pay-performance sensitivity estimated for the large sample 
of non-financial companies in the Italian Stock Exchange market for which we hand-collected the 
data on CEO pay, tenure and age and kinship with the controlling family (whenever the firm is fam-
ily owned). We use a specification where the performance variable is interacted with the dichoto-
mous variables indicating low and high competition according to the two different dimensions of 
competitive pressure we measure, i.e. IMP_PEN and TYPE.  Notably, the source of the competitive 
pressure is different across the two classifications, as foreign trade may generate “price competi-
tion” while endogenous sunk costs is more likely to imply “non-price competition”.  The dependent 
variable is the log of total compensation in thousands of 2000 constant Euros (lrtotcomp). We 
measure performance by the log of Market Capitalization (lrmktcap also in constant Euros) and by 
the return on asset (ROA) as a book measure of performance. Firm size, CEO tenure and CEO age 
are the control variables. We rely on the fixed effect model to control for other omitted and unob-
servable factors and we add time dummies to account for time-specific common factors, like the 
business cycle or changes in foreign trade liberalization or regulations that may affect Italian firms’ 
competitive environment. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm 
level.  
Table 4 reports the results from estimating relationship between pay and performance where 
the performance term is interacted with the competition dummies. The results show that the esti-
mated coefficients on Perf*High_Comp is always positive and highly significant irrespective of 
how we measure performance (ROA or market capitalization) while the coefficients on 
Perf*Low_Comp is always insignificant except in Column (3), where competitive pressure is meas-
ured by import penetration. Our findings, consistently with Hypotheses 1 and 2, suggest that pay-
performance is high and significant where competition in the market is tougher, as defined by both 
high import penetration and by vertical differentiation sustained by endogenous intangible assets as 
R&D investments and advertising expenditures. The evidence is similar whether we use the ac-
counting or the market-based performance variable.  
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Turning to control variables, we find that CEO pay is positively related with firm size, con-
sistently with consolidated evidence that managerial compensation increases with firm size, and 
with CEO tenure, consistently with corporate governance literature that suggests that the longer the 
tenure the stronger the power of the CEO and his/her ability to increase the compensation. CEO age 
is negatively related with pay, but the coefficient is never significant. 
Prima facie evidence shows that where competitive pressure is low, firms do not feel com-
pelled to motivate their managers with incentive compensation contracts. In contrast, where com-
petitive pressure is tough, both in terms of import penetration and as measured by strategic sunk in-
vestment expenditures, CEO pay-performance sensitivity is high and significant, consistently with 
our H1 and H2.  
 
5.2 The “competition” effect and the “family” issue  
We now take into account that competition may be systematically correlated with the unob-
served component of compensations if CEOs sort themselves into different sectors according to the 
degree of competition. We thus rely on family control, an important feature of the Italian corporate 
governance system, to help us with the identification of the effect of competition. As discussed 
above, the theory suggests that the structure of compensation contracts in family companies and 
with family CEOs is likely to differ from that of managers in widely-held companies, for example 
because agency and monitoring problems are more typical in public companies, or because the rent 
expropriation hypothesis is more likely to apply to family firms. In a similar vein, differences be-
tween family and non-family CEOs may arise because of managerial slack or entrenchment in a 
poorly monitored environment.  Therefore, if competitive forces drive pay-performance sensitivity, 
market competition should also level all differences out, as suggested in Section 3. 
This is what we test in Table 5. Empirically, the test implies that we interact performance with 
the two dummies to account for competition levels (Low_Comp and High_Comp), and, at the same 
time, with two dummies indicating whether the CEO is a member of the controlling family 
(FamCEO vs. No_FamCEO).  We then test the significance of the difference between the coeffi-
cients of family and non-family CEOs’ pay-performance sensitivities for the relevant cases. We re-
port the results at the bottom of the table.  
The estimated coefficients show that both family and non-family CEOs report high and statis-
tically significant pay-performance sensitivities when competitive pressure is high (the only excep-
tion is the positive coefficient on family CEOs’ in Column (3) where the p-value is 13%).  When 
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we turn to firms in industries with low competitive pressure, however, we find that pay-
performance remains high and significant for family CEOs (when performance is measured by 
ROA) while it is always insignificant for non-family CEOs. Interestingly, these results suggests 
that, contrary to much of the theoretical literature and of the empirical evidence, family CEOs in 
Italy (hence family firms) tend to rely on incentive contracts, typically designed to discipline agen-
cy problems, more frequently than non family CEOs.17  The high sensitivity of family CEO pay to 
performance may hint at a signaling behavior by family firms who wish to convince the equity mar-
ket and minority investors that their family managers operate in line with optimal contracting and 
best practice of corporate governance. From this point of view this would be consistent with what 
predicted by Jensen and Meckling (1976) when they first introduced bonding related agency costs 
that the founder of the firm has to bear when increasing shares of the firm are offered to the equity 
market.  
Finally, to gauge the effect of competition, we look at tests of differences in coefficients at the 
bottom of the table. We find that the pay-performance sensitivity of family CEOs significantly dif-
fers from that of non-family firms in less competitive sectors. The difference is significant if we use 
ROA (Columns (1) and (3)), not if we use market capitalization.18 More importantly, the difference 
in pay-performance sensitivity of family and non-family CEOs is no longer significant within high-
ly competitive industries. In other words, when competitive pressure toughens differences in pay-
performance sensitivity disappear. This evidence is consistent with our Hypothesis 5 as well as pre-
vious evidence for UK firms by Cunat and Guadalupe (2005), supporting the idea that competition 
shapes the structure of compensations in line with optimal contracting and with best practice corpo-
rate governance.   
5.3 Are Family CEOs different? Testing for “camouflage”: asymmetry in pay sensitivity  
The results above show that differences in incentive compensations between family and 
non-family CEOs in less competitive industries tend to disappear when the competitive pressure 
toughens. However, our theoretical framework has advanced questions related to family CEOs that 
the above tests does not address, particularly about the latitude that family CEOs might have in the 
                                                            
17 Notably, non-family CEOs are evenly distributed across family and non-family firms (50.9 vs. 49.1%) and the share 
of non-family CEOs in family firms is 38%. 
18  If we perform the test on the subsample of manufacturing firms (thereby excluding public utilities and building con-
struction companies), we find that the difference between family and non-family CEOs Type-0 (homogenous) industries 
is significant also when performance is measured by market capitalization. 
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extraction of rents and private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders. In this 
section, we experiment further on pay-performance relationships in order to understand if, behind 
the apparently similar sensitivity in highly competitive environments that we found in Table 5, a 
“family control” specificity may be detected. .  
Table 6 tests the asymmetry of the pay-performance sensitivity and, particularly, the differ-
ence between family and non-family CEOs in this respect.  Motivated by the debate about compen-
sations allegedly related to performance increases, but not  to decreases (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), 
we investigate whether the responsiveness of pay to performance of family and non-family CEOs in 
competitive industries is similar (symmetric) in good times and in bad times, that is when the com-
pany reports positive and negative changes in the performance measure. This analysis allows us fur-
ther insights into the corporate governance of family firms as, for example, family CEOs might 
compensate their lower pay (see Table 3) by reducing its sensitivity to performance in bad times 
and by increasing the elasticity in good times, in other words by maneuvering the symmetry in the 
structure of the compensation. To test the asymmetry in pay-performance sensitivity, we focus on 
the accounting profitability index, the Return on Asset ratio, which we first-difference and then use 
to construct  two dichotomous variables, one that identifies the positive changes in ROA (Dumpos) 
and one for the negative changes in ROA (Dumneg). Then we estimate first-differenced regressions 
of the pay-performance equation, interacting ROAs with Dumpos and Dumneg and with FamCEO 
and no-FamCEO dummies, in order to estimate separately the effect of positive and negative 
changes in profitability on family and non-family CEOs pay (see also Joskow and Rose, 1994).  
Table 6 reports the results for the full manufacturing sector and for industry sub-samples by 
price and non-price competition (Type 0 vs. Type 1) and for high vs. low import penetration (be-
cause further interacting the above variables with competition-related dummies would be awkward). 
The results for the full sample in Column (1) suggest that there is a differential sensitivity in good 
and bad periods. While both coefficients estimated for non-family CEOs are statistically significant 
and positive, indicating that their compensations change with changes in (accounting) profitability, 
family CEO pay seems to respond only to positive changes in profitability, not to negative changes. 
Interestingly, judging by the estimated coefficients, the remuneration of non-family CEOs seems to 
be highly sensitive to negative changes.  
The remaining columns of Table 6 estimate asymmetries conditioning for industry competi-
tion. Based on the previous result that differences between family and non-family CEOs tend to dis-
appear when competition bites, our purpose is to investigate whether also pay-performance asym-
metries disappear in competitive environments.  The results by sub-samples reveal an interesting 
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pattern that differs from the apparently smooth evidence in Column (1) , but is similar across the 
two definitions of “competition”. First of all, in less competitive industries, where pay-performance 
was found to be overall insignificant in Table 4, the analysis by asymmetry shows that non-family 
CEOs’ pay is sensitive to positive changes in profitability (Columns (2) and (4)). In contrast, in 
highly competitive industries (highly sensitive according to Table 4), results show that family CEOs 
pay is only sensitive to positive ROA changes while non-family CEOs’ pay is only sensitive to neg-
ative changes in profitability.  
This suggests an asymmetry in the structure of pay for family and non-family CEO that sur-
faces in competitive environments, hence in those industries where, according to the evidence in 
Table 5, pay-performance sensitivity did not statistically differ. The new evidence in Table 6 sug-
gests that the source of high sensitivity is indeed different.  Specifically, non–family CEOs see their 
pay decrease when profitability falls, while family-CEOs see their pay increase when profitability 
grows.  If an outsider investor looks at pay of family CEO, at prima facie it would believe it is posi-
tively related to performance in line with optimal contracting, but a second look into the structure of 
the contract would reveal that family CEOs compensations only respond to positive changes, con-
sistently with Bebchuk and Fried (2004) as well as with our Hypothesis 3b.  
 
5.4 The 2007-2008 financial crisis and incentive compensation  
 
What are the implications of the financial crisis of 2007, and of the economic downturned 
that followed for the pay-performance schemes of Italian firms’ CEOs? Did the competitive condi-
tions combine with the crisis to tighten or relax the relationship between CEO pay and performance, 
and are family CEOs’ compensations protected by their apparently asymmetric incentive schemes? 
As described in Section 3, our last piece of evidence derives from a difference in difference exercise 
exploiting the financial crisis episode as a “quasi-natural” experiment in which the effect of the cri-
sis is combined with the degree of competition in the industry. The purpose is to test if sensitivity 
has significantly increased after the 2007 crisis in industries where competition is tougher. Moreo-
ver, we also test if differences can be detected between family and non-family CEOs. The specifica-
tion we estimate is the following:   
    
Log(CEOpay)it= 0 + 1Competitionj*Post2007t + 0Performanceit + 1Performanceit*Post2007t + 
2 Competitionj*Post2007t*Performanceit + 3FirmSizeit + 4CEO Tenureit + 5CEO_Ageit  i + t + it 
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where Competition is in turn defined as Type-1 (vertically differentiated industries) and high 
import penetration industries, Performance is alternatively the Return to Assets or the log of Market 
Capitalization and Post2007 is a dummy variable that takes value one from 2008 onwards. 1 indi-
cates the direction of the change in the level of compensations in the years following the crisis with-
in industries more exposed to competition; 1 accounts for the change in the slope of pay-
performance sensitivity during the downturn following the financial crisis.   Finally, the key coeffi-
cient is 2, which captures the differential effect of the crisis between industries where the competi-
tive pressure is more or less tough.  All regressions include firm fixed effects and time dummies. 
Given that the firms do not change industry, the fixed effects also capture the existence of any in-
dustry specific fixed effect, including the effect on the level of the compensation.  
The results are presented in Table 7. The first four columns report the results for the sub-
sample of family CEOs and the remaining four columns report the estimated coefficients for the 
sub-sample of non-family CEOs.19    
The pay structure of family CEOs seems remarkably unaffected by the crisis. The relation-
ship between pay and performance remains positive and significant, confirming previous evidence 
in Table 5, while the interactions included to capturing the differential impact of the crisis as well as 
of market competition are insignificant. The only exception is the negative sign on the significant 1 
coefficient in Column (4), indicating that the crisis apparently reduced sensitivity to performance 
(firm value) for family CEO (in line with the evidence from the analysis of asymmetry). However, 
we also note that the sign on the 1 coefficient is negative, albeit insignificant, suggesting that com-
pensations decreased after the crisis, in highly competitive industries.  
When we turn to non-family CEOs, we find sharper results suggesting that the financial cri-
sis had had a statistically significant impact on the level and structure of non-family CEOs, espe-
cially if operating in highly competitive industries. To begin with, we notice that the significance of 
the coefficients on the linear performance variables is not very strong (even below the conventional 
standard in Column (3)). Second, we find that, for non-family CEOs, the negative impact of the cri-
sis on the level of their compensation in highly competitive industries is statistically significant. 
Third, and more importantly, their pay sensitivity to performance increased significantly in the post 
crisis years, provided they operate in highly competitive environments. In other words, the crisis 
has made the pay of non-family CEOs much more susceptible to performance as compared to the 
previous period.  Linking the evidence presented in Table 5 – whereby family and non-family CEO 
                                                            
19  In the appendix Table A1, we report the results for the full sample.  
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do not seem to differ in competitive industries –to the results in Table 6 – non-family CEOs pay is 
more sensitive to performance in bad periods – and in Table 3 – pay of non-family CEOs is signifi-
cantly higher - we can conclude that in good years, non-family CEOs succeed in detaching (through 
entrenchment, weak monitoring or poor governance) their compensations from performance, but 
not in bad years. When bad times loom, our results suggest that not only competitive pressure, but 
also some form of corrective mechanism tightens the link between CEO pay and firm’s results. 
Whether it is the financial market, perhaps through the presence institutional investors, or the family 
(for non-family CEOs in family firms) this is a promising question in our research agenda.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
We have analyzed how product market competition and family ties contribute to shape the 
CEO compensation in Italian listed firms over the 2000-2011 period. Our purpose is to study the ef-
fect of competition on the level and structure of CEO pay and, in doing so, our analysis naturally 
extends to governance features of the Italian corporate economy and to the impact of the recent fi-
nancial crisis effect on CEO pay for performance sensitivity.  We rely on two sources of competi-
tive pressure: import penetration and non-price competition, as determined by strategic escalation in 
endogenous sunk costs to sustain the competitive advantage in vertically differentiated markets. To 
account for family ties we rely on family ownership and focus on family control, i.e. identifying 
whether the CEO is a member of the controlling family. We use two alternative measures for per-
formance, the accounting return on assets and the firm value, i.e. market capitalization.   
We draw on the corporate governance and agency theories to develop testable predictions 
about the level and the sensitivity of managerial compensations to firm performance.  
Our main results can be summarized as follow. Overall, the compensation of Italian CEOs is 
positively related to firm performance. Moreover, consistent with our predictions, sensitivity is 
higher in competitive sectors and the difference between family and non-family CEOs disappear 
when competition is tough, supporting our hypothesis that competition levels differences (and man-
agerial slack) out. Family CEOs receive a significantly lower pay than non-family CEOs, but their 
pay is related to firm performance, which is in contrast with the traditional agency view.  Therefore, 
we further dig into the family question by investigating whether the responsiveness of family and 
non-family CEOs is the same in good and in bad times.  We find that, behind this apparent sensi-
tivity the response to performance changes is asymmetric, particularly in competitive industries: 
while non-family CEOs remunerations mainly respond to negative changes, family CEOs pay is 
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sensitive only to positive changes. This suggests a sort of self-insurance for family CEOs aimed at 
preventing that their compensation fall too much when the firm’s results deteriorate.  
Finally, we find that the 2007 financial crisis reduces the difference between family and 
non-family CEO by reducing the level of compensation of non-family CEOs and increasing its re-
sponsiveness to performance.  Altogether, our results provide supporting evidence to the idea that 
market competition eventually prevails over family ties even in a family-controlled governance sys-
tem such as in Italy. 
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 Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
      
 Mean Std.Dev. Min Max N. Obs. 
Total Compensation 899 1825 92 36720 1037 
Market Capitalization 2224960 7946719 3712.07 88830072 1064 
ROA 0.100 0.066 -0.11 0.52 1071 
Firm Sales 2760147 9503376 4367.64 88864424 1071 
Ceo tenure 7.068 5.726 1 31 1088 
Ceo age 55.295 9.681 33.00 86.00 1086 
Family dummy 0.705 0.456 0 1 1088 
Family Ceo dummy 0.437 0.496 0 1 1088 
High R&D and Advertising (Type) dummy 0.649 0.477 0 1 1173 
High Import Penetration (Imp_Pen) dummy 0.391 0.488 0 1 1173 
 
Note: CEO compensations, Market Capitalization and Sales are in Thousands of 2000 constant Euros 
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Table 2 
Percentage Share of Family Firms and Family CEOs in high/low competitive industries 
Type 0 and Type 1 denote industries with low and high R&D and advertising intensity. Family control is defined 
based on the family membership of the CEO in each year. (Standard errors are in parenthesis). The p-values are 
based on two-sided test of the null hypothesis that the difference in the share of family firms, family CEOs and 
family CEOs in family firms (vs. their respective counterparts) in each industry type is equal to 0. 
 
 
Type 0 
N = 481 
Type 1 
N = 607 
Difference 
by Type 0 
and Type 1 
p-value 
Low Im-
port Pene-
tration 
N = 569 
High Import 
Penetration 
N = 519 
Difference by 
Import  
Penetration 
p-value 
       
% of Family firms 
62.6 
(2.21) 
76.8 
(2.22) 
-14.2 
p = 0.000 
60.3 
(2.05) 
81.7 
(1.70) 
-21.4 
p = 0.000 
% of Family CEOs 34.5 
(2.17) 
50.9 
(2.03) 
-16.4 
p = 0.000 
38.5 
(2.04) 
49.3 
(2.20) 
-10.8 
p = 0.000 
% of Family CEOs 
in Family Firms 
55.1 
(2.87) 
N=301 
66.3 
(2.19) 
N=466 
-11.2 
p=0.002 
63.8 
(2.60) 
60.4 
(2.38) 
3.47 
P=0.326 
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Table 3 – Mean CEO compensation by competition and control  
CEO compensation is in thousands of 2005 Euros, ROA is the EBITDA/Total Asset ratio. Type 0 and Type 1 denote industries with low and high R&D and advertising intensity. Family 
control is defined based on the family membership of the CEO in each year. (Standard errors are in parenthesis). The p-values are based on two-sided test of the Null hypothesis that the 
difference in the average compensation /average ROA between two different groups is equal to 0. 
 
Panel A: Mean CEO Compensation by product differentiation / import penetration and family control 
 Total observations N = 1037 
Type 0 
N = 457 
Type 1 
N = 580 
Difference by 
Type 0/Type 1 
p-value 
Low Import 
Penetration 
N = 539 
High Import 
Penetration 
N = 498 
Difference by Im-
port Penetration 
p-value 
Total observations  811.4 (85.7) 
968.0 
(75.4) 
-156.6 
p = 0.170 
1011.5 
(103.4) 
777.2 
(36.9) 
234.3 
p = 0.038 
Non-Family CEO 
N=586 
1061.9 
(71.7) 
 
992.6 
(124.6) 
N=298 
1133.5 
(68.0) 
N = 288 
-141.0 
p = 0.326 
1134.1 
(117.0) 
N = 333 
966.7 
(61.9) 
N = 253 
167.3 
p = 0.248 
Family CEO 
N=451 
687.3 
(90.2) 
 
471.8 
(70.8) 
N = 159 
804.7 
(133.4) 
N = 292 
-333.9 
p = 0.077 
813.2 
(192.9) 
N = 206 
581.5 
(34.9) 
N = 245 
231.8 
p = 0.201 
Difference 
p-value 
374.5 
p = 0.001 
520.8 
p = 0.004 
328.8 
p = 0.058  
320.9 
p = 0.132 
385.3 
p = 0.000  
Panel B: Mean ROA by product differentiation / import penetration and family control 
 Total observations N = 1071 
Type 0 
N = 470 
Type 1 
N = 601 
Difference by 
Type 0/Type 1 
p-value 
Low Import 
Penetration 
N = 556 
High Import 
Penetration 
N = 515 
Difference by Im-
port Penetration 
p-value 
Total observations  0.093 (0.003) 
0.105 
(0.002) 
-0.011 
p = 0.005 
0.094 
(0.003) 
0.107 
(0.003) 
-0.013 
p = 0.001 
Non-Family CEO 
N=603 
0.106 
p=(0.003) 
 
0.107 
(0.004) 
N=311 
0.105 
(0.004) 
N = 292 
0.001 
p = 0.787 
0.110  
(0.004) 
N = 344 
0.101 
(0.004) 
N = 259 
0.009 
p = 0.114 
Family CEO 
N=468 
0.092 
p=(0.003) 
 
0.068 
(0.004) 
N = 159 
0.105 
(0.004) 
N = 309 
-0.037 
p = 0.000 
0.068 
(0.003) 
N = 212 
0.112 
(0.004) 
N = 256 
-0.045 
p = 0.000 
Difference 
p-value 
0.014 
p = 0.000 
0.039 
p = 0.000 
0.000 
p = 0.951  
0.042 
p = 0.000 
-0.012 
p = 0.043  
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Table 4 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Competition by Industry Type 
 
 Type 1 vs. Type 0 High vs. Low Imp_Pen. 
 ROA MktCap ROA MktCap 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (5) 
     
Perf*High_Comp 1.314*** 0.156*** 1.059** 0.184*** 
 (0.499) (0.057) (0.523) (0.057) 
Perf*Low_Compr 0.556 0.091 0.905* 0.077 
 (0.543) (0.068) (0.520) (0.067) 
Log(sales) 0.369*** 0.333*** 0.366*** 0.333*** 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) 
CEO tenure 0.021* 0.022* 0.021* 0.022* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
CEO_Age -0.073 -0.067 -0.077 -0.068 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) 
     
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,024 1,018 1,024 1,018 
Number of firms 115 114 115 114 
     
R2 0.198 0.199 0.197 0.201 
 
Notes. Fixed effects estimates. Time dummies included in all columns. “Perf” denotes the perfor-
mance variable, which is in turn the ROA (Return to Total Assets) and the log of Market Capitaliza-
tion. Type 0 denotes industries with homogeneous and horizontally differentiated products; Type 1 
denotes research- and advertising- intensive industries (vertically differentiated products); High and 
Low Imp_Pen denote industries with high and low import penetration. Robust standard errors in pa-
rentheses are clustered by firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 5  
Pay-Performance sensitivity by Industry Type and Family Origin of the CEO 
 
 
 Type 1 vs. Type 0 High vs. Low Imp_Pen 
VARIABLES ROA MktCap ROA MktCap 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Perf*High_Comp*FamCEO 1.237** 0.145** 0.997 0.178*** 
 (0.616) (0.059) (0.661) (0.059) 
Perf*High_Comp*No-FamCEO 1.442** 0.153*** 1.151* 0.182*** 
 (0.672) (0.057) (0.675) (0.058) 
Perf*Low_Comp*FamCEO 1.683** 0.089 1.988*** 0.075 
 (0.692) (0.066) (0.585) (0.066) 
Perf*Low_Comp*No-FamCEO 0.126 0.077 0.406 0.068 
 (0.656) (0.066) (0.607) (0.065) 
Log(sales) 0.363*** 0.343*** 0.362*** 0.339*** 
 (0.071) (0.075) (0.071) (0.076) 
CEO tenure 0.021* 0.022* 0.021* 0.022* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
CEO_Age -0.076 -0.064 -0.082 -0.067 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.058) (0.061) 
     
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
H0Perf*Low_Comp: FCEO=NFCEO (p-value) 0.052 0.244 0.028 0.453 
H0Perf*High Comp: FCEO=NFCEO (p-value) 0.800 0.320 0.855 0.569 
     
Observations 1,024 1,018 1,024 1,018 
Number of firms 115 114 115 114 
     
R2 0.202 0.202 0.201 0.202 
Notes. Fixed effects estimates. Time dummies included in all columns. “Perf” denotes the performance 
variable, which is in turn the ROA (Return to Total Assets) and the log of Market Capitalization. Type 0 
denotes industries with homogeneous and horizontally differentiated products; Type 1 denotes research- 
and advertising- intensive industries (vertically differentiated products); High and Low Imp_Pen denote 
industries with high and low import penetration. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by 
firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 6  
Asymmetry in Pay-performance sensitivity across Family and non-Family CEOs by 
Toughness of Competition 
 Full sample Type 0 Type 1 Low I_P High I_P 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Positive ROA*FamCEO 0.928** 0.253 1.123** 0.373 1.332** 
 (0.456) (1.063) (0.518) (0.743) (0.624) 
Positive ROA*No-FamCEO 1.021** 0.940* 1.007 0.916* 1.148 
 (0.419) (0.539) (0.609) (0.540) (0.705) 
Negative ROA*FamCEO 0.662 -0.428 0.941 -0.229 1.210 
 (0.528) (1.063) (0.634) (0.735) (0.746) 
Negative ROA*No-FamCEO 1.422** 1.382 1.316* 1.232 1.598* 
 (0.594) (0.843) (0.777) (0.899) (0.833) 
Log(sales) 0.165* 0.255** 0.033 0.275*** -0.030 
 (0.097) (0.101) (0.152) (0.095) (0.161) 
CEO tenure 0.033*** 0.052*** 0.023 0.052*** 0.021 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) 
CEO_Age 0.026 0.049 0.008 0.039 -0.003 
 (0.047) (0.067) (0.061) (0.064) (0.066) 
      
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 813 343 470 410 403 
      
R2 0.086 0.116 0.092 0.106 0.097 
 
Notes. First-difference estimates. Type 1 and Type 0 denote industries with high/low R&D and advertising 
intensity; L_IP and H_IP denote industries with high/low import penetration. Robust standard errors in pa-
rentheses are clustered by firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 7 
Pay-performance sensitivity and the recent crisis by family control 
 Family CEOs Non-Family CEOs 
Dep. Var.: 
Total Compensation 
Type Import Penetration Type Import Penetration 
ROA MaktCap ROA MktCap ROA MaktCap ROA MktCap 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Performance 1.545*** 0.137** 1.572*** 0.143** 0.792* 0.142* 0.714 0.137** 
 (0.550) (0.057) (0.554) (0.061) (0.470) (0.072) (0.494) (0.068) 
Competition*Post07 0.125 -0.548 -0.042 -1.800 -0.332* -1.946* -0.243 -2.472** 
 (0.147) (0.981) (0.172) (1.277) (0.196) (1.055) (0.193) (0.968) 
Performance*Post07 -0.730 -0.066 -0.499 -0.092* -1.739 -0.110 -1.027 -0.084 
 (1.086) (0.043) (0.901) (0.053) (1.607) (0.078) (1.410) (0.055) 
Perf*Comp*Post07 1.438 0.065 1.638 0.154 3.474** 0.148* 2.733* 0.192** 
 (1.686) (0.083) (1.702) (0.108) (1.726) (0.084) (1.685) (0.078) 
Log(sales) 0.291*** 0.336*** 0.264** 0.296*** 0.464*** 0.379*** 0.466*** 0.411*** 
 (0.105) (0.103) (0.106) (0.097) (0.098) (0.091) (0.102) (0.099) 
CEO tenure 0.025* 0.028** 0.027** 0.029** 0.027 0.028* 0.025 0.028* 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
CEO_Age -0.070 -0.057 -0.057 -0.059 -0.157* -0.144* -0.154* -0.098 
 (0.074) (0.078) (0.073) (0.082) (0.079) (0.076) (0.080) (0.069) 
         
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 445 445 445 445 579 573 579 573 
Number of firms 60 60 60 60 80 79 80 79 
         
R2 0.261 0.248 0.248 0.247 0.238 0.248 0.234 0.256 
Notes. Fixed effects estimates. Performance is in turn ROA (Return to Total Assets) and the log of Market Capitalization. Post07 is a dummy equal tto 1 
for the the year 2008 onwards. Competition is in turn Type 1 and Type 0 denoting industries with high/low R&D and industries with High vs. Low import 
penetration. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10   
40 
 
Appendix  
Table A1 
Pay-performance sensitivity and the recent crisis by nature of the competition 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Type Import Penetration 
VARIABLES ROA MarketCap ROA MarketCap 
     
Performance 0.875** 0.135*** 0.870** 0.136*** 
 (0.379) (0.048) (0.384) (0.048) 
Competition*Post07 -0.033 -1.016 -0.054 -1.728** 
 (0.145) (0.848) (0.142) (0.742) 
Perf * Post07 -0.533 -0.067 -0.250 -0.058 
 (1.285) (0.063) (1.116) (0.041) 
Perf * Comp * Post07 1.490 0.087 1.281 0.142** 
 (1.425) (0.069) (1.355) (0.061) 
     
Log(sales) 0.370*** 0.341*** 0.368*** 0.344*** 
 (0.073) (0.070) (0.073) (0.071) 
CEO tenure 0.021* 0.023** 0.020* 0.021* 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
CEO_Age -0.077 -0.072 -0.070 -0.049 
 (0.057) (0.054) (0.056) (0.052) 
     
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,024 1,018 1,024 1,018 
Number of firms 115 114 115 114 
R2 0.203 0.209 0.201 0.217 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
